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Abstract 
Using the data from Chinese Household Income Project, we study the effect of education expansion 
on intergenerational mobility of education measured with intergenerational transmission of 
education (ITE) through an exogenous shock, higher education expansion in 1999. Measuring ITE 
with years of schooling, higher education expansion (HEE) significantly decreases ITE, meaning 
that the gap of years of schooling between the children from different family educational 
background is narrowed by HEE and intergeneration mobility of education is promoted by HEE. 
However, when we take school quality into account and measure ITE with score of college entrance 
examination (CEE), HEE insignificantly decreases ITE measured with score of CEE, indicating that 
HEE fails to reduce the gap of higher education quality between the children from different family 
educational background and the inequality of higher education still maintains in some way even 
after HEE. We also find that ITE measured with years of schooling has an inverted-U relationship 
with college admission rate and ITE measured with score of CEE seems not correlate with college 
admission rate, which directly demonstrate the theories of MMI and EMI in the field of sociology. 
We further investigate the internal mechanism of the effects and we consider that the original of the 
inequality of higher education is the inequality of basic education. At last, we investigate the 
heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE by gender, type of Hukou and category of CEE. 
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The Effect of Education Expansion on Intergenerational 
Mobility of Education: Evidence from China 
1. Introduction 
Education is a key mechanism for intergenerational mobility which is one of the primary topics 
in the study of inequality (Huang, 2013; Breen, 2010; Saar, 2010; Iyigun, 1999; Parman, 2011). 
Equality of education is essential for intergenerational mobility (Corak, 2013). Intergenerational 
mobility will increase if the education expansion decreases the gap of human capital investment 
between children from different family background, meaning that the newly-added educational 
opportunities induced by education expansion are likely to be obtained by the children from poor 
family background. Otherwise, intergenerational mobility will decrease.  
Economists usually measure intergenerational mobility with the intergenerational correlation 
of socioeconomic status like income, education and occupation. Intergenerational income elasticity, 
denoting intergenerational income mobility, is the most common way to measure intergenerational 
mobility and many literatures studies the effect of educational policy on intergenerational income 
elasticity. Pekkarinen et al. (2009) investigate the effect of Finland’s comprehensive school reform 
on intergenerational income elasticity, showing that this reform increases intergenerational mobility 
in Finland. Mayer and Loope (2008) consider that American government spending reduces the gap 
of human capital investment between rich and poor children and improves the intergenerational 
income mobility. Li et al. (2014) estimate the extent of intergenerational income elasticity in China 
which indicates that China’s intergenerational mobility is very low and consider that government 
spending of public education fails to effectively promote social mobility. However, when we take 
the income as the measurement of socioeconomic status and measure intergenerational mobility 
with intergenerational income elasticity, we probably face a dilemma. Usually, we only can get the 
information about transitory income which obtains too much random fluctuation and measurement 
error. Solon (1992) shows that the extent of intergenerational income mobility is usually biased 
downward by measurement error, unrepresentative samples or both. In the other hand, if we take 
the average income of several years as permanent income to measure intergenerational income 
elasticity and take lifetime earnings into account, the sample size is relatively smaller, which 
probably restricts the expandability of the study. Precisely measuring the extent of intergenerational 
  
income mobility is a challenging task. Some economists measure the socioeconomic status with 
occupation, but intergenerational mobility of occupation relied on rough sorting of occupational 
reputation can’t suitably reflect the changes in intergenerational mobility.1 In this article, we use 
intergenerational mobility of education to represent intergenerational mobility and measured it with 
intergenerational transmission of education (ITE), which presents the effect of family educational 
background on children’s education attainment. Education is a good measurement of socioeconomic 
status and has advantages relative to earnings, like less measurement error and lifecycle bias. 
Additionally, extensive literature has proved that higher education is associate with many other 
beneficial characteristics such as higher earnings, better health and longer lifespans (Black and 
Devereux, 2011)2.  
ITE and the effect of educational policy on ITE have been received much attention in 
economical literatures during the last decade. Heineck and Riphahn (2007) explore the tendency of 
the changes of ITE in Germany and find that the extent of ITE insignificantly decrease during the 
last five decades in which the German education system underwent numerous reforms in order to 
improve the equality of educational opportunity. Blanden and Machin (2013) claim that higher 
education expansion enlarges the gap of higher education attainment between rich and poor children 
and increases the extent of ITE in UK. Sturgis and Buscha (2015) find similar conclusions in 
England and Wales. Other literatures finds that some educational reforms increase ITE and reduces 
the relative advantages in education attainment of the children from better family educational 
background (Bauer and Riphahn, 2006; Bauer and Riphahn,2009). Using 1990 and 2000 Chinese 
Population Censuses, Magnani and Zhu (2015) employ nonparametric estimation strategies to 
provide a systematic investigation of ITE in urban China and find that ITE increases with time. 
Another strand of literatures aims at understanding the determinates or origins of ITE. Black and 
Devereux (2011) claim that the earliest literatures in this filed focuses on disentangling the 
                                                        
1 Long and Ferrie (2013) investigate the intergenerational occupational mobility in Great Britain and the United 
States since 1850. They take occupations into four categories, like white collar, famer, skilled and semiskilled, and 
unskilled. Every category comprises many different occupation. For example, white collar comprises professional, 
technical, and kindred; managers, officials, and proprietors; clerical; and sales. We consider that this classification 
of occupation is plausible in nineteenth century because the former occupational structure is relative simply and it 
may face big challenge now because social division of labor is very complex in modern society. 
2 We do not mean that ITE is the best measurement of intergenerational mobility, but it seems not to be involved 
with measurement error or some other potential problems. 
  
competent of intergenerational correlation due to genetics, which is predetermined and called as 
nature effect, and the competent due to childhood environment, which is called as nurture effect. 
More recently, some literature, like Black et al. (2005), Oreopoulos et al. (2006), Chevalier(2004), 
Maurin and Mcnally (2008), and Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002), try to identify the causal effect 
of parents’ socioeconomic status on children’s outcome. However, their conclusions are inconsistent.  
Sociologists also very concern about intergenerational mobility. In the field of sociology, there 
are two classical theories about intergenerational mobility of education, maximally maintained 
inequality (MMI, Raftery and Hout, 1993) and effectively maintained inequality (EMI, Lucas, 2001). 
MMI implicates that the background related educational inequality first increases and then decreases 
and the effect of family background on education attainment will vanish when a level of education 
is nearly universal, so that the relationship between education supply and the extent of ITE likes an 
inverted-U shape. However, EMI states that social background allocates students to different types 
of education (school quality) and educational gap between the children from different family 
background always maintain even though a level of education is nearly universal. The two theories 
focus on different aspects of education, one is years of schooling and another is school quality. Few 
economic literatures takes school quality into account when investigates ITE. In this article, we 
focus on the following questions: How about the effects of education expansion on the ITE 
measured by years of schooling and the ITE about school quality? Is there a significant difference 
between the two effects? How about the internal mechanism of the effects of education expansion 
on ITE and the heterogeneity in the effects? 
In 1999, China’s central government made a strategic decision to expand tertiary education. 
From 1998 to 1999, the number of college admissions increased by 460 thousand and the college 
admission rate increased from 34% to 56% which represents the probability of enrolling in college. 
In the following ten years, this radical policy annually increased 500 thousand newly-added higher 
education opportunities on average, which is called a great leap forward in revolution of higher 
education (Li and Xing, 2010). Unlike the higher education expansion in UK which gradually 
increases the college enrollments, China’s higher education expansion is a radical and unexpected 
educational reform and makes college education become universal in several years. This policy, 
likes a quasi-natural experiment, gives us a great opportunity to investigate the causal effect of 
education expansion on ITE. This paper is one of the first studies about the effect of higher education 
  
expansion (HEE) on ITE in China and contributes to understanding the effect of HEE on ITE in 
three ways. First, we get a comprehensive effect of HEE on ITE through measuring ITE with years 
of schooling and school quality. The second contribution is that we critically examine that the theory 
of MME and EMI. Finally, we investigate the internal mechanism of the effect of HEE on ITE and 
find the origins of higher education inequality.  
Our main findings could be summarized as follow: When we measure ITE with years of 
schooling, HEE decreases ITE and ITE has an inverted-U relationship with the extent of the supply 
of higher education which directly demonstrates MMI. However, when we measure ITE with score 
of college entrance examination (CEE) denoting college quality, the empirical results show that 
HEE insignificantly changes ITE and ITE seems not to be correlated with college admission rate 
which is consistent with EMI. The internal mechanism shows that family educational background 
positively correlates with the type of senior high school. The marginal effect of type of senior high 
school on years of schooling is decreased by HEE and HEE insignificantly changes the marginal 
effect of type of senior high school on score of CEE, which induces the difference between the effect 
of HEE on ITE measured with years of schooling and the effect of HEE on ITE about school quality. 
At last, we find the heterogeneity in the effects by gender, type of Hukou, and the category of CEE.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follow. Section 2 introduces the data set we used. 
Section 3 reports the empirical results about the effect of HEE on ITE measured with years of 
schooling. In section 4, we investigate the effect of HEE on ITE about school quality. We focus on 
the heterogeneity in the effects of HEE on ITE in Section 5. Section 6 is the conclusion. 
2. Data 
2.1 CHIP 
Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) has conducted five waves of household surveys 
and collects detailed information about incomes and expenditures, employment status, family 
structure, and social and economic characteristics at both personal and household level. HEE was 
implemented in 1999. The students who were firstly affected by HEE usually finished a four-years 
college in 2003. We only use two latest surveys in this article, CHIP 2008 and CHIP 2014. CHIP 
2008 was surveyed in the early 2008 and contains 5000 households in migration sample, 8000 
households in rural sample and 5000 households in urban sample. CHIP 2014 was surveyed in the 
  
July and August 2014 and contains 7175 urban households, 11013 rural households, and only 760 
migrant households. We only use the rural sample and urban sample in this article because CHIP 
2014 does not nationally collect the information of migration.  
2.2 Data Processing 
For analyzing the effect of HEE on ITE, the main information we need is individuals’ 
educational information and their parents’. We match individual and his or her parents via family 
structure information3. CHIP 2008 and CHIP 2014 all contain 105416 individuals and contain 89267 
individuals that could theoretically match their parents’ information. We successfully match 85433 
individuals with their parents’ information. In the matched sample, there are 70297 individuals that 
do not participate CEE and we drop them. Additionally, we drop the individuals who lost important 
variables and the individuals whose personal information is illogical, likely years of schooling is 
greater than age. We also drop the individuals that his/her father is sixty years older than him/her or 
his/her mother is fifty years older than him/her. Eventually, we get a sample with 6596 individuals 
for analyzing the effect of HEE on ITE measured with years of schooling and a subsample with 
5760 individuals for analyzing the effect of HEE on ITE about school quality. 
3. ITE measured with years of schooling  
In this section, we investigate the effect of HEE on ITE measured with years of schooling and 
the internal mechanism of this effect. First, we conduct the empirical model for regression and 
investigate the effect of HEE on ITE measured with years of schooling. Second, we rule out the 
potential endogeneity. At last, we examine the internal mechanism. We state that we only focus on 
the ITE measured with years of schooling in this section. 
3.1 Regress model and descriptive statistics 
3.1.1 Regress model 
We investigate the effect of HEE on ITE through examining that whether HEE changes the 
marginal effect of family educational background on children’s education attainment. The linear 
model used to investigate the effect could be written as follow: 
                                                        
3 In CHIP, every individual reports his relationship with householder, so we can precisely identify that who 
are the individual’s parents in a family. 
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Dependent variable edu_yearipy denotes the years of schooling of individual i who participated 
CEE in province p and y indicates the year in which the individual participated CEE. We take max 
level of parents’ education, pedui, as the key independent variable denoting family educational 
background. exami is a dummy variable which equals to 1 means individual i was affected by HEE, 
otherwise it equals to 0, and the effect of exami on years of education is absorbed by dummies for 
years of CEE denoted by εy. δp represents the fix effect of the province where the individual 
participates the examination. Xj denotes a series of control variables, includes age, age of father and 
mother, dummies for gender, type of Hukou (Urban or Rural), category of CEE, and survey year. 
μipy is the error term. If α2 is significantly unequal to 0, then HEE affects ITE. 
The estimator α2 is biased if and only if variable exam or pedu correlates with error term. In 
fact, students can repeatedly participate CEE through repeating twelfth grade and the decision of 
repeating twelfth grade may correlates with some unobservable factors contained by error term. 
However, the time cost of repeating twelfth grade is very huge because CEE is annually hold. 
Particularly, no one can guarantee that he/she gets a satisfactory score of CEE through repeatedly 
participating CEE and the students repeating twelfth grade usually bear much psychological and 
emotional stress (Feng and Ding, 2007). We do not mean that no one would repeat twelfth grade for 
repeatedly participating CEE, but little student continuously repeats twelfth grade, so individuals 
can’t arbitrarily choose the year of participating CEE. We consider that the endogeneity involved in 
this article is not serious, nonetheless, we critically take the potential endogeneity into account and 
rule out it in two ways. 
3.1.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of main variables. We find that the average years of 
schooling is 14.49 and the average level of parental education is 3.50. 55% individuals are affected 
by HEE, 43% are female which reflects the serious gender discrimination of human capital 
investment in China, and 45% Hukou were rural when they participated CEE. The average age of 
observations is 32.99.  
 
  
Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year of schooling 6596 14.49 1.969 10 24 
Max level of parental education 6596 3.50 2.032 1 9 
HEE (Yes=1, No=0) 6596 0.55 0.497 0 1 
Gender (Female=1, Male=0) 6596 0.43 0.496 0 1 
Hukou (Rural=1, Urban=0) 6596 0.45 0.498 0 1 
Category of CEE (Social=1, Science=2, Art=3) 6596 1.68 0.598 1 3 
Paternal age 6596 61.00 11.239 38 107 
Maternal age 6596 59.38 10.927 36 98 
Age 6596 32.99 8.968 17 57 
Year of participating examination 6596 1998.80 9.021 1981 2012 
Note: Data source is CHIP 2008 and CHIP 2014. 
3.2 Empirical results 
3.2.1 The effect of HEE on ITE (years of schooling) 
Based on equation (1), we investigate the effect of HEE on ITE and the empirical results are 
presented in Table 2. In the first column, the effect of the level of parental education on children’s 
education attainment is positive at the 1% significance level and the OLS estimator of α1 indicates 
that children’s years of schooling will averagely increase by 0.12 if the level of parental education 
increases 1. The estimated coefficient of interaction term is significantly negative which means that 
the gap of years of schooling between children from different family educational background is 
reduced by HEE when holding other variables unchanged, so HEE decreases the extent of ITE. In 
the next column, we narrow the time span of CEE (From 1984 to 2012) and the empirical results 
also show that HEE significantly lowers the extent of ITE. Continuously narrowing the time span 
of CEE, we get similar results in the last two columns.  
  Table 2   The effect of HEE on ITE (Years of schooling) 
Dependent Variable: Years of schooling 
 ALL  1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Max level of parental education 0.119*** 0.131*** 0.142*** 0.160*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.034) 
Max level of parental education *HEE -0.085*** -0.091*** -0.087*** -0.083*** 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 6596 6163 5435 4620 
r2_a 0.203 0.188 0.168 0.164 
Notes: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
  
The results in Table 2 suggest that HEE reduces ITE by 0.083 to 0.091, almost two thirds initial 
extent of ITE. When we measure ITE with years of schooling, we claim that HEE decreases the 
extent of ITE and the inequality of higher education, which means that HEE reduces the advantage 
in enrolling college of children from better family educational background relative to the children 
from poor family educational background. 
3.2.2 Endogeneity 
The economical and psychological cost of repeating twelfth grade are very expensive, so few 
students repeated twelfth grade over and over. In fact, individuals just right be affected by HEE 
through repeating twelfth grade if and only if they first participated CEE just a few years before 
1999, therefore not all the individuals who repeat twelfth grade would induce endogeneity. If we 
drop the individuals who repeat twelfth grade and just right be affected by HEE, to some extent, we 
can solve endogeneity. We exclude the individuals who participated college entrance examination 
in 1999 or 2000 and the empirical results are presented in Table 3, showing that HEE significantly 
decreases ITE measured with years of schooling and are very similar with Table 2. We consider that 
the causal effect of HEE on ITE is negative and HEE increases the intergenerational mobility of 
education. 
Table 3   Excluding the effect of repeating twelfth grade on ITE 
                    Dependent Variable: Years of schooling 
 ALL 1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Max level of parental education 0.120*** 0.132*** 0.143*** 0.163*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.034) 
Max level of parental education*HEE -0.100*** -0.104*** -0.096*** -0.088** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 6116 5683 4955 4140 
r2_a 0.202 0.188 0.169 0.168 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. We drop the individuals who participated CEE in 1999 and 2000. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
The correlation between birthyear and the year of participating college entrance examination 
is very strong. According to China educational system, we conduct a dummy variable (Birth_dummy) 
for birthyear that equals to 1 if the individual born in or after 1981 which means that the individual 
is expectedly affected by HEE, otherwise equals 0 which means that the individual is not expectedly 
  
affected by HEE.4 We test the effect of birthyear on whether being affected by HHE. Table 4 
presents the empirical results, showing that all estimated coefficients of Birth_dummy are positive 
at 1% significance level which proves that birthyear strongly correlates with whether being affected 
by HEE. More importantly, we find that family educational background has no effect on whether 
being affected by HEE. The estimated coefficients of other variables are also very closed to zero. In 
conclusion, the results in Table 4 indicate that the birthyear is the key determinant of whether being 
affected by HEE rather than the family educational background and unobservable factors inducing 
the potential endogeneity. 
Table 4  The correlation between birthyear and HEE 
                  Dependent Variable: HEE 
 ALL  ALL  1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Birth_dummy 0.9278*** 0.7379*** 0.7156*** 0.6928*** 0.6784*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0226) (0.0239) 
Max level of parental 
education 
 0.0017 0.0021 0.0026 0.0031 
  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0021) 
Age of father  0.0005 0.0007 0.0008 0.0010 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0009) 
Age of mother  -0.0012* -0.0015** -0.0019** -0.0026** 
  (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0011) 
Age  -0.0110*** -0.0135*** -0.0164*** -0.0169*** 
  (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0021) 
Gender  -0.0051 -0.0068 -0.0082 -0.0095 
  (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0065) 
Hukou  0.0093 0.0132* 0.0173** 0.0200** 
  (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0070) (0.0091) 
Control_X N Y Y Y Y 
N 6596 6596 6163 5435 4620 
r2_a 0.8571 0.8693 0.8585 0.8265 0.7304 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
In our sample, no one knows that China central government would implement college 
expansion before their birth because HEE was unexpectedly proposed in November 1998 and was 
rapidly implement in the next year, so variable Birth_dummy is an exogeneous variable. On the 
other hand, variable Birth_dummy strongly correlates with whether being affected by HEE. 
However, in equation (1), the possible endogenous variable is the interaction term. In practice, we 
take interaction term of Birth_dummy and max level of parental education as the instrument variable 
for the endogenous interaction term (Qian, 2008).  
                                                        
4 According to China’s educational system and the regulation of school admission rate, the individuals should 
participate CEE at 18, so we except that the individuals who born in or after 1981 participated CEE in or after 1999.  
  
The following equation estimates the first-stage effect of interaction term constructed by 
dummy for birthyear and family educational background on the instrument variable constructed by 
dummy for HEE and family educational background. 

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The second-stage regress is as follows: 
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Table 5 First-stage regression (ITE measured with years of schooling) 
Dependent Variable: Max level of parental education*HEE 
 ALL  1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Birth_dummy*Max level of parental education 0.928*** 0.926*** 0.920*** 0.901*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 6596 6163 5435 4620 
r2_a 0.928 0.923 0.913 0.891 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 5 presents the empirical results of first-stage regression and shows a very strong 
correlation between two interaction terms. Then Table 6 shows the empirical results of second-stage 
regression, indicating that HEE decreases ITE measured with years of schooling. The value of F-
test is great than 10 which means we do not involve in the problem of weak instrument variable. 
Given the empirical results of ruling out endogeneity, we claim that HEE decreases ITE and improve 
intergenerational mobility of education. 
Table 6  Second-stage regression (ITE measured with years of schooling) 
Dependent Variable: Years of schooling 
 ALL  1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Max level of parental education*HEE -0.058** -0.065*** -0.054* -0.042 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.037) 
Max level of parental education 0.108*** 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.131*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.031) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 6596 6163 5435 4620 
F_test 5011 4692.78 3731.55 1829.4 
chi2 9352.008 1.8e+04 4354.079 1.6e+04 
r2_a 0.205 0.189 0.170 0.166 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
3.3 College admission rate and ITE (years of schooling) 
The directive effect of HEE on higher education attainment is promoting college admission 
rate and college admission rate reflects the supply of higher education. To some extent, the effect of 
  
HEE on ITE is similar with the effect of college admission rate on ITE. Without taking school 
quality into account, we analysis the relationship between college admission rate and ITE in two 
extreme case, in which the rate equals 0 and 1. If college admission rate equals 0, meaning that no 
one goes to college even though the children from the best family educational background, then ITE 
equals 0. In another case, college admission rate equals 1, meaning that higher education is universal 
and everyone goes to college even though the children from the poorest family educational 
background, then ITE also equals 0. Therefore, we propose that ITE first increase and then decrease 
while college admission rate continuously increases from 0 to 1 given the assumptions that 
continuous change in ITE is induced by variation of college admission rate and that ITE is always 
positive, which conforms with the theory of MMI.  
Table 7 Test the relationship between college admission rate and ITE (Years of schooling) 
Dependent Variable: Years of schooling  
ALL 1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Max level of parental education -0.2720** -0.3667*** -0.3421*** -0.7328*** 
 (0.0946) (0.1090) (0.1052) (0.1887) 
Max level of parental education * 
College admission rate 
2.2828*** 2.7210*** 2.6657*** 4.1337*** 
(0.4860) (0.5606) (0.5414) (0.8255) 
Max level of parental education * 
College admission rate square 
-2.9030*** -3.3404*** -3.2756*** -4.5416*** 
(0.5390) (0.6131) (0.5944) (0.8248) 
N 6596 6163 5435 4620 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
r2_a 0.2093 0.1944 0.1759 0.1728 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. College admission rate implies the annually national college 
admission rate which denotes the annually-national probability of enrolling in college. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
     
Figure1a Time trend of college admission rate        Figure1b Time trend of ITE measured with years of schooling 
We consider that the relationship between college admission rate and ITE measured with years 
of schooling is inverted-U. We test this suspect through replacing the interaction term in equation 
(1) with another two interaction terms constituted by max level of parental education with college 
admission rate and its square and the empirical results are presented in Table 7. In Table 7, the 
estimated coefficients of interaction term between max level of parental education and college 
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admission rate are significantly positive and the estimated coefficients of another interaction term 
between max level of parental education and square of college admission rate are significantly 
negative, indicating that the extent of ITE increases first and then decreases while college admission 
rate increases from 0 to 1 (reach peak value when college admission rate almost equals 0.4). The 
relationship between college admission rate and ITE measured with years of schooling is an 
inverted-U shape. 
We examine the inverted-U relationship between college admission rate and ITE measured 
with years of schooling in another way. In Figure 1a, we clearly describe the time trend of college 
admission rate and find that college admission rate positively correlates with time trend on the whole 
and HEE rapidly promotes college admission rate in 1999. Based on the year of participating CEE, 
we take every three years individuals as a group and simultaneously estimate the extent of ITE of 
every group. Figure 1b describes the time trend of ITE, showing that ITE positively correlated with 
college admission rate before HEE and ITE negatively correlated with college admission rate after 
HEE, which is consistent with the empirical results in Table 2 and Table 7. In conclusion, our 
empirical results about the relationship between college admission rate and ITE measured with years 
of schooling demonstrate the theory of MMI and show that the inequality of higher education related 
with family background gradually vanish after HEE. 
3.4 Internal mechanism 
ITE represents the effect of family educational background on years of schooling. In China, 
whether studying in a better senior high school is very important for enrolling in a college (Park et 
al., 2015). First, we think that the effect of family educational background on whether studying in a 
better senior high school is positive. Then, we suppose that the effect of whether studying in a better 
senior high school on years of schooling is positive and the extent of this positive effect is decreased 
by HEE. Because HEE increases millions newly-added college admission places so that the students, 
come from a relative poor senior high school, have a greater probability of enrolling in a college 
after HEE. We admit that we couldn’t examine all potential mechanisms of the effect of HEE on 
ITE because of the limitation of data and knowledge5. 
                                                        
5 To some extent, the internal mechanism ignores the family human capital investment after the individuals 
enter senior high school. Due to the limitation of data, we do not investigate the difference of family human capital 
  
Table 8   Family educational background and the type of senior high school 
Dependent Variable: The level of senior high school  
 ALL  1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Max level of parental education  0.086***  0.076**  0.079*** 0.048* 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.027) 
Max level of parental education*HEE -0.005 0.006 0.002 0.032 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.033) (0.038) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 3843 3664 3360 2981 
r2_a 0.059 0.056 0.057 0.054 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Only CHIP 2014 collects the information about the type of senior high school which the 
individual ever went to. We value the type of senior high school and bigger number represents better 
senior high school6. Table 8 presents the results about the correlation between family educational 
background and the type of senior high school. The estimated coefficients about family educational 
background are positive at 1% significance level, showing that children from better family 
educational background have a greater opportunity to study in a better senior high school relative to 
the children from poor family educational background. The estimated coefficients of interaction 
terms are insignificant which means that the relationship between family educational background 
and the type of senior high school keep same after HEE. 
Table 9  The type of senior high school and years of schooling 
Dependent Variable: Years of schooling 
 ALL  1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
The level of senior high school 0.357*** 0.327*** 0.352*** 0.366*** 
 (0.059) (0.065) (0.068) (0.074) 
The level of senior high school*HEE -0.124** -0.093 -0.116* -0.128* 
 (0.057) (0.064) (0.063) (0.068) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 3843 3664 3360 2981 
r2_a 0.230 0.200 0.183 0.176 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Next, we investigate the relationship between years of schooling and the type of senior high 
school. We replace family educational background with the type of senior high school which denotes 
                                                        
investment between the individuals in a same senior high school and we only can compare the effects of type of 
senior high school on years of schooling after/ before HEE, but we investigate the effect family educational 
background on the type of senior high school children studied which is also an important component of internal 
mechanism. 
6 The questionnaire take the type of senior high school into six levels. There are national or provincial key 
senior high school (=6), city or district key senior high school (=5), county or other level key senior high school (=4), 
non-key senior high school (=3), specialized secondary or vocational secondary senior high school (=2), others (=1). 
  
in regress equation (1) and Table 9 presents the empirical results. The effect of the type of senior 
high school on years of schooling is positive at 1% significance level and this effect is significantly 
decreased by HEE which means that the gap of years of schooling between children from different 
type of senior high school is narrowed by HEE. Additionally, the type of senior high school 
positively correlates with family educational background, so the effect of family educational 
background on years of schooling is decreased by HEE and HEE improve intergenerational mobilty.  
4. ITE about school quality  
Years of schooling can’t reflect the school quality. Because no matter whatever kind of four-
year college you go in to, your years of schooling is 16. However, the gap of school quality between 
elite college and ordinary college can induce the difference of future socioeconomic status. Li et al. 
(2012) find that the returns to attending elite college is 10.6% even after control for student ability, 
major, and other factors and wage premium is larger for female and students with better-educated 
fathers. Based on regression discontinuity designs, Jia and Li (2016) find that the monthly wage 
premium of elite education is between 700-900 RMB (105-135 USD). In this section, we try to 
investigate the effect of HHE on ITE about school quality and get a comprehensive understanding 
about the effect. 
4.1 Measurement of School quality  
We use score of CEE to measure school quality of the college that individuals ever went to and 
the reasons are as follows: Firstly, higher score you get means better college you will go in to. Jia 
and Li (2016) show that score of CEE above the elite university cutoffs raise the admission 
probability by 17-19 percentage points, about 60%-70% of the mean probability. Secondly, the score 
also positively correlates with years of schooling. If someone wants to go to a four-years college 
(high-quality college), he/she usually get a higher score comparing with the individuals who only 
could go to a three-years college (medium-quality college). Thirdly, the college entrance 
examination admission system is very fair because the only one admission criteria is score of CEE. 
Based on equation (1), Table 10 presents the empirical results about investigating the 
relationship between score of CEE and type of college.7 In every column, we find that score of CEE 
                                                        
7 Only CHIP 2013 (Urban) collects the information about the college that individuals went to. In survey 
questionnaire, CHIP takes the college into seven categories, 985 Project College (best college, valuing 6), 211 Project 
  
positively correlates with type of college at 1% significance level, meaning that higher score you 
get and better college you will go in to. Table 11 presents the empirical results about examining the 
relationship between score of CEE and years of schooling, showing that score of CEE also positively 
correlates with years of schooling at 1% significance level. In summary, score of CEE is a feasible 
measurement of school quality and it also positively correlates with years of schooling.  
Table 10 The relationship between score of CEE and type of college 
Dependent Variable: Type of college 
 ALL 1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Score of CEE 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 2518 2371 2129 1823 
r2_a 0.510 0.506 0.507 0.531 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 11 The relationship between score of CEE and years of schooling 
 Dependent Variable: Years of schooling 
 ALL 1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Score of CEE 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 5760 5421 4826 4141 
r2_a 0.320 0.303 0.289 0.279 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
4.2 Regress model and descriptive statistics 
4.2.1 Regress model 
Based on equation (1), we replace years of schooling with score of CEE and get equation (4) 
to investigate the effect of HEE on ITE about school quality.  



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210 X*ep_cee   (4) 
Variable cee_scoreipy denotes the score of CEE of individual i who participated CEE in 
province p and y indicates the year in which the individual participated CEE. Other variables are 
consistent with equation (1).  
                                                        
College but not 985 Project College (better college, valuing 5), other ordinary public college (good college, valuing 
4), independent college (fair college, valuing 3), private college (poor college, valuing 2), adult continuing education 
(poorest college, valuing 1) and foreign college (best college, valuing 6). Additionally, we take only high senior 
school as the worst schooling quality and value it 0. 
  
4.2.2 Descriptive statistics and analysis 
Not all individuals who participated CEE report their score of CEE, the sample we used to 
analysis the effect of HEE in ITE about school quality is smaller than the sample we used above.  
Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample used to analysis the effect of HEE on ITE 
about school quality. We keep the individuals whose score locate between 1%-99% of the 
distribution. The average score of CEE is 452.75 (maximum score is 750 for most provinces).  
Table 12  Descriptive statistics (school quality) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Score of CEE 5760 452.75 90.286 150 650 
Max level of parental education 5760 3.51 2.012 1 9 
HEE (Yes=1, No=0) 5760 0.57 0.495 0 1 
Gender (Female=1, Male=0) 5760 0.44 0.496 0 1 
Hukou (Rural=1, Urban=0) 5760 0.46 0.499 0 1 
Category of CEE (Social=1, Science=2, Art=3) 5760 1.68 0.594 1 3 
Paternal age 5760 60.49 11.127 38 107 
Maternal age 5760 58.91 10.837 36 98 
Age 5760 32.56 8.892 17 57 
Year of participating examination 5760 1999.26 8.927 1981 2012 
Note: data source is CHIP 2008 and CHIP 2014. 
Table 13 The difference between the two samples 
    Sample A 
(Obs. 5760) 
  
Sample B 
(Obs.836) 
 
Analysis of diff. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. P-Value(H0:diff=0) 
Years of schooling 14.48 1.963 14.54 1.969 -0.056 0.4430 
Max level of parental education 3.51 2.012 3.41 2.16 0.097 0.1952 
HEE (Yes=1, No=0) 0.57 0.495 0.42 0.493 0.156 0.0000 
Gender (Female=1, Male=0) 0.44 0.496 0.41 0.493 0.023 0.2079 
Hukou (Rural=1, Urban=0) 0.46 0.499 0.39 0.488 0.073 0.0001 
Category of CEE (Social=1, 
Science=2, Art=3) 
1.68 0.594 1.7 0.628 -0.017 0.4469 
Paternal age 32.56 8.892 35.98 8.921 -3.429 0.0000 
Maternal age 60.49 11.127 64.45 11.405 -3.96 0.0000 
Age 58.91 10.837 62.61 11.006 -3.698 0.0000 
Year of participating examination 1999.26 8.927 1995.68 9.053 3.58 0.0000 
Note: data source is CHIP 2008 and CHIP 2014. 
In Table 13, we analysis the difference between the sample of Table 12 (named it Sample A) 
and another sample including the individuals who do not report score of CEE (named it Sample B)8. 
                                                        
8 Sample A combines with Sample B which equals the sample in Table 1. 
  
The last two columns show the difference between the two samples and the probability that this 
difference equals 0. We find that years of schooling, max level of parental education, gender and  
category of CEE are not significantly different in two samples. However, other variables are all 
significantly different in two samples at 1% significance level. We consider that recalling score of 
CEE is more difficult for the individuals who participated CEE earlier, which induces average age 
of the individuals in Sample B is greater than Sample A. Due to the difficulty of recalling score of 
CEE is greater than the difficulty of recalling years of schooling, the significant difference between 
two samples are mainly appeared in the variables associating with time. 9 
4.3 Empirical results 
4.3.1 The effect of HEE on ITE (school quality) 
Based on equation (4), we investigate the effect of HEE on ITE about school quality and the 
empirical results are presented in Table 14. The estimated coefficients of max level of parental 
education are positive at 1% significance level, showing that the level of parental education 
increases by 1 which induces score of CEE to increase by 3.6 to 4.110. However, the estimated results 
of interaction terms show that HEE insignificantly decreases ITE about school quality and the 
inequality of higher education quality keeps the same even after HEE.  
Table 14 The effect of HEE on ITE about school quality 
Dependent Variable: Score of CEE 
 ALL  1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Max level of parental education 4.017*** 3.831*** 3.596*** 4.051*** 
 (0.878) (1.032) (1.007) (0.821) 
Max level of parental education*HEE -0.736 -0.506 -0.079 -0.186 
 (0.958) (1.065) (1.024) (1.186) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 5760 5421 4826 4141 
r2_a 0.160 0.120 0.106 0.107 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
4.3.2 Endogeneity 
Next, we rule out the potential endogeneity using the same method mentioned above. For 
                                                        
9 The degradation of memory is inevitable and there is no evidence, showing that the degradation of memory 
could induce endogeneity or sample selection bias. 
10 In China, CEE is the most competitive examination. Hundreds students get a same score, so you surpass 
hundreds competitors if your score of CEE just increases one point. 
  
dropping the individuals who just right were affected by HEE through repeating twelfth grade, we 
exclude the individuals who participated CEE in 1999 or 2000 and the empirical results are 
presented in Table 15, showing that the empirical results in Table 14 are not involved in endogeneity 
induced by repeating twelfth grade. 
Table 15   Excluding the effect of repeating twelfth grade on ITE (school quality) 
Dependent Variable Score of CEE Ln(score of CEE) 
1981-2012 1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 1984-2012 1989-2012 
Max level of parental education 4.100*** 3.906*** 3.666*** 4.117*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 (0.882) (1.042) (1.013) (0.817) (0.003) (0.003) 
Max level of parental education*HEE -1.146 -0.842 -0.296 -0.257 -0.004 -0.001 
 (1.128) (1.194) (1.114) (1.253) (0.004) (0.004) 
N 5353 5014 4419 3734 5014 4419 
Control_X Y Y Y Y Y Y 
r2_a 0.158 0.115 0.101 0.102 0.103 0.090 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.We also show the empirical 
results when we replace dependent variable cee_score with its nature logarithm ln(cee_score). 
Table 16 First-stage regression (ITE about school quality) 
Dependent Variable: Max level of parental education* HEE 
 ALL  1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Max level of parental education* Birth_dummy 0.932*** 0.930*** 0.924*** 0.909*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 5760 5421 4826 4141 
r2_a 0.930 0.926 0.916 0.895 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 17 Second-stage regression (ITE about school quality) 
Dependent Variable: Score of CEE 
 ALL  1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Max level of parental education*HEE 0.202 0.646 1.470 1.903 
 (1.296) (1.429) (1.661) (1.781) 
Max level of parental education 3.720*** 3.355*** 2.737** 2.545** 
 (0.946) (1.117) (1.253) (1.132) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 5760 5421 4826 4141 
F_test 11234.4 11488.6 9062.45 3531.54 
chi2 2731.685 499.346 326.872 570.159 
r2_a 0.161 0.121 0.107 0.106 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
As same as subsection 3.2.2, we take the interaction terms of max level of parental education 
and dummy for birthyear (Birth_dummy) as the instrument variable of interaction term in equation 
(4) and the first-stage regression model and second-stage regression model are similar with equation 
  
(2) and equation (4). The empirical results of first-stage regression are presented in Table 16, 
showing that the instrument variable strongly correlates with endogenous variable. Table 17 presents 
the results of second-stage regression which indicate that the effect of HEE on ITE about school 
quality is insignificant. 
4.4 College admission rate and ITE (school quality) 
Similarly, we test the relationship between college admission rate and the ITE about schooling 
quality and Table 18 presents the empirical results. We do not find a significantly inverted-U 
relationship between college admission rate and ITE about school quality. Figure 2 also proves this 
and the theory of EMI is demonstrated.  
Table 18 The relationship between college admission rate and ITE about school quality 
 
Dependent Variable: Score of CEE 
1981-2012 1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Max level of parental education 2.5310 -1.2786 -0.4559 -0.0117 
 (5.1309) (6.8466) (7.1995) (0.0417) 
Max level of parental education * 
College admission rate 
10.2264 26.9595 21.4906 0.1124 
(26.2935) (31.5809) (32.2119) (0.1740) 
Max level of parental education * 
College admission rate square 
-14.9473 -31.5105 -24.5066 -0.1184 
(29.3834) (33.6331) (33.8337) (0.1700) 
N 5760 5421 4826 4141 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
r2_a 0.161 0.120 0.106 0.097 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Figure 2 Time trend of ITE about school quality  
4.5 Robustness check 
We examine the robustness of results in Table 14 through using the natural logarithm of score 
of CEE and the empirical results are presented in the first two columns of Table 19, showing that 
-5
0
5
1
0
IT
E
(s
c
h
o
o
l 
q
u
a
lit
y
)
81-83 84-86 87-89 90-92 93-95 96-98 99-01 02-04 05-07 08-10
Year of college entrance examination
  
HEE insignificantly affects the extent of ITE about school quality. Furtherly, we drop the individuals 
who participated CEE in 1999 or 2000 and the empirical results are presented in column 3th and 4th 
of Table 19, showing that our conclusion seems not affected by endogeneity. At last, we investigate 
the effect of HEE on ITE measured with years of schooling using Sample A and the empirical results 
are presented in last two columns of Table 19, indicating that HEE decreases the extent of ITE 
measured with years of schooling and the potential problem induced by degradation of memory 
seems not serious. We also check the robustness of the relationship between college admission rate 
and ITE about school quality through using the natural logarithm of score of CEE and the time trend 
of ITE measured with natural logarithm of score of CEE are described in Figure 3. 
Table 19   Robustness check  
Dependent Variable: Ln(score of CEE) Ln(score of CEE) Years of schooling 
 1984-2012 1989-2012 1984-2012 1989-2012 1984-2012 1989-2012 
Max level of parental education 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.127*** 0.131*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.028) 
Max level of parental education*HEE -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.089** -0.079** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.032) (0.032) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 5421 4826 5014 4419 5421 4826 
r2_a 0.107 0.095 0.103 0.090 0.191 0.169 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Figure 3 Time trend of ITE measured with nature logarithm of score of CEE 
HEE decreases the extent of ITE measured with years of schooling and HEE insignificantly 
lowers ITE measured with score of CEE, so HEE reduces the inequality of higher education 
attainment but fails to reduce the inequality of higher educational quality. Additionally, we find that 
the college admission rate has an inverted-U relationship with ITE measured with years of schooling 
but not do correlate with ITE measured with score of CEE, which demonstrate the theories of EMI 
and MMI. In the other word, HEE improve the supply of higher education and higher education 
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become nearly universal and, so HEE reduces the gap of years of schooling between children from 
different family educational background. However, the supply of high-quality college is always 
scarce and HEE is a very radical and unexpected policy, so HEE fails to significantly improve the 
supply of high-quality college and promote the intergenerational mobility. The inequality of higher 
education still maintains. 
4.6 Internal mechanism 
According to Table 8 and Table 9, family educational background positively correlates with 
the type of senior high school and HEE decreases the marginal effect of type of senior high school 
on years of schooling, so HEE deceases the extent of ITE measured with years of schooling. Next, 
we will examine that whether HEE significantly changes the marginal effect of type of senior high 
school on score of CEE and the empirical results are presented in Table 20. In Table 20, we find that 
the marginal effect of type of senior high school on score of CEE is not significantly affected by 
HEE, so HEE insignificantly affect the extent of ITE measured with score of CEE.  
Table 20 The type of senior high school and score of CEE 
Dependent Variable: Score of CEE 
 ALL  1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
The level of senior high school 17.656*** 17.389*** 17.249*** 19.964*** 
 (2.181) (2.548) (2.796) (2.181) 
The level of senior high school*HEE -1.365 -1.061 -0.801 -3.555 
 (2.955) (3.545) (3.326) (2.457) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 3843 3664 3360 2981 
r2_a 0.221 0.180 0.161 0.160 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Kirst (2007) shows that the unequal educational opportunity in secondary school induces the 
gap of college admission rate and college quality between the children from different family 
background. Based on the empirical analysis about internal mechanism in section 3.4 and section 
4.6, we consider that the original of the inequality of higher education is the inequality of senior 
high school or even the inequality in elementary education stage. Reducing the inequality of higher 
education not only bases on adding the supply of higher education, but also relies on lowering the 
inequality of basic education. 
5. Heterogeneity 
It is meaningful to investigate the heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE. We investigate 
  
the heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE by gender, Hukou, and the category of CEE. 
5.1 Gender 
In China, gender discrimination widely exists (Liu et al.,2000; Wie and Lee, 2017). The 
descriptive statistics shows that as high as 56% individuals are male and only 44% individuals are 
female, which indicates that male has greater opportunity to participating CEE and accept more 
human capital investigate than female. We investigate the heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE 
measured with years of schooling by gender and Table 21 shows the empirical results. In Table 21, 
the estimated coefficients of max level of parental education of male is smaller than female, 
indicating that the intergenerational mobility of education of female is lower than male. Because of 
gender discrimination, family with poor economic resource tend to invest human capital for male 
and only the family with enough economic resource likely invest human capital for female which 
induce that the correlation between female human investment and family educational background 
is stronger than male. Further, compared with males, the effect of HEE on female ITE measured 
with years of schooling is greater, so the gap of years of schooling between females from different 
family educational background is decreased more by HEE. HEE reduces gender discrimination of 
educational attainment through increasing the supply of higher education. 
Table 21 Heterogeneity by gender (ITE measured with years of schooling) 
Dependent Variable: Years of schooling Male Female 
1984-2012 1989-2012 1984-2012 1989-2012 
Max level of parental education 0.097*** 0.116*** 0.173*** 0.170*** 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.027) (0.024) 
Max level of parental education*HEE -0.073* -0.076 -0.114** -0.096** 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.046) (0.040) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 3473 3010 2690 2425 
r2_a 0.191 0.174 0.186 0.160 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 Table 22 Heterogeneity by gender (ITE about school quality) 
 Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Dependent Variable: Score of CEE Male Female 
1984-2012 1989-2012 1984-2012 1989-2012 
Max level of parental education 3.704*** 3.270** 4.054*** 4.112*** 
 (1.199) (1.134) (1.129) (1.057) 
Max level of parental education*HEE -0.057 0.660 -0.882 -0.714 
 (1.496) (1.388) (1.599) (1.684) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 3034 2658 2387 2168 
r2_a 0.116 0.107 0.136 0.112 
  
Table 22 presents the empirical results about the heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE 
about school quality by gender. We also find that the estimated coefficient of max level of parental 
education of female is greater than male which is also probably induced by gender discrimination. 
Particularly, the interaction terms are all statistically insignificant even though they are not totally 
equal, which means that the heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE about schooling quality by 
gender is insignificantly. Combine with Table 21 and Table 22, HEE only reduces the gender 
discrimination of education attainment through decreasing the extent of ITE measured with years 
of schooling and does not lower the gender discrimination of school quality because HEE fails to 
reduce the extent of ITE about school quality.11 
5.2 Rural and urban  
The household register system, like the type of Hukou, could make the gap of opportunity to 
education between the children with different type of hukou (Li et al. 2015). We investigate the 
heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE by the type of Hukou and the empirical results are 
presented in Table 23 and Table 24. 
Based on our data, college admission rate of urban student is 49% and the rate of rural student 
is 29% before HEE. According to the relationship between college admission rate and ITE measured 
with years of schooling, the gap of college admission rate between urban and rural induces the 
difference of the estimated coefficients of max level of parental education between rural and urban 
in Table 23. As mentioned above, the extent of ITE reach the peak value when college admission 
rate almost equals 0.4, so the ITE of urban locates at the right side of the peak and the extent of ITE 
of rural locates at the left side of the peak. After HEE, our data shows that college admission rate of 
urban student is 63% and the rate of rural student is 58%, so the difference of increasing range of 
college admission rate between rural and urban students induces the difference of the effect of HEE 
on ITE measured with years of schooling between rural and urban. 
                                                        
11 Lin and Lin (2012) find that Taiwan’s higher education expansion does change parents' attitude on female 
children's education and increase the possibility for female children to attain higher education. Furtherly, parents do 
not change their spending behavior on children's education after the higher education expansion, which explains that 
the phenomenon of credentialism still prevails in Taiwanese. Credentialism is similar with pursuing elite college, so 
parents do not reduce the investment on their children’s education which results in that intergenerational mobility of 
education still maintain. Unfortunately, we can’t investigate the effect of HEE on family education expenditure due 
to the limitation of data. 
  
In Table 24, we investigate the heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE about school quality 
by Hukou. The difference of the estimated coefficients of max level of parental education between 
rural and urban may be induced by the gap of public education expenditure between rural and urban. 
The public education expenditure in rural in smaller than urban, so personal human capital 
investment more depend on family human capital investment in rural. However, HEE significantly 
increase ITE measured with score of CEE in urban and insignificantly change the extent of ITE 
measured with score of CEE in rural. We suppose that the family human capital investment in urban 
is increased by HEE which induces that the effect of family educational background on score of 
CEE increases. Because of the limitation of data, we can’t examine this suspect.12 
Table 23  Heterogeneity by the type of Hukou (ITE measured with years of school) 
Dependent Variable: Years of schooling Urban Rural 
1984-2012 1989-2012 1984-2012 1989-2012 
Max level of parental education 0.106*** 0.113*** 0.163*** 0.177*** 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.030) (0.041) 
Max level of parental education*HEE 0.003 -0.001 -0.085 -0.096 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.056) (0.063) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 3333 2896 2830 2539 
r2_a 0.119 0.108 0.211 0.179 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 24  Heterogeneity by the type of Hukou (ITE about school quality) 
Dependent Variable: Score of CEE Urban Rural 
1984-2012 1989-2012 1984-2012 1989-2012 
Max level of parental education 3.002** 2.399** 3.116* 4.142* 
 (1.035) (1.088) (1.553) (2.014) 
Max level of parental education*HEE 2.168* 2.841** 0.017 -1.024 
 (1.234) (1.282) (1.725) (1.803) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 2887 2541 2534 2285 
r2_a 0.121 0.111 0.121 0.108 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
5.3 The category of CEE 
CHIP collects the information about the category of CEE that the individuals participated. 
Participating different category of CEE means facing different college admission rate. Generally, 
comparing with the individuals who participated the CEE of social, the individuals who participated 
                                                        
12 CHIP 2008 and CHIP 2014 do not collect the information about the family educational expenditure of the 
individuals who have already leave school.  
  
the CEE of science and engineering face a higher college admission rate. Because China government 
focus on the development of nature science.  
The categories of CEE are social, science and art. We only focus on the results about the 
categories of CEE are social and science. Because the score of CEE is not the only criterion of 
college admission for art students. The empirical results about this heterogeneity are presented in 
Table 25 and Table 26. In Table 25, The estimated coefficients of max level of parental education 
are different in two groups due to the difference of public senior high school expenditure between 
two groups. Compared with the students participated CEE of science, China government focus on 
the development of nature science and the students participating CEE of social receive less public 
education expenditure, so the family education expenditure is relatively more important for the 
students of social and the gap of human capital investment between the students of social from 
different family background is greater. According to our data, for the students of social, HEE 
increases the college admission rate by 28 percent points and for the student of science the college 
admission rate increases 19 percent points. The effect of HEE on college admission rate is 
heterogenous which induces that the heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE measured with years 
of schooling by category of CEE. 
Table 25 Heterogeneity by the category of CEE (ITE measured with years of schooling) 
Dependent Variable: Years of schooling Social Science 
1984-2012 1989-2012 1984-2012 1989-2012 
Max level of parental education 0.162*** 0.187*** 0.113*** 0.121*** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033) 
Max level of parental education*HEE -0.102*** -0.114*** -0.078** -0.067* 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.033) (0.035) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 2393 2131 3336 2921 
r2_a 0.186 0.163 0.197 0.181 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Table 26 presents the empirical results about the heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE 
measured with score of CEE by category of CEE. The estimated coefficients of max level of parental 
education in first two columns are bigger than that in last two columns. Before HEE, most senior 
high schools tend to allocate more educational resource to science students which induces that the 
effect of family educational investment on score of CEE of science students is smaller than this 
effect of social students because public educational expenditure could reduce the gap of human 
  
capital investment between the children from different family educational background (Mayer and 
Loope, 2008). After HEE, the college admission rate of social students increases most rapidly which 
induces that the higher educational quality of social students decreases most rapidly, so the students 
from better family educational background tend to choose science and students from better family 
educational background tend to receive more family human investment which results in that HEE 
increases the ITE about school quality of science students and HEE decreases the ITE about school 
quality of social students.  
Table 26 Heterogeneity by the category of CEE (ITE about school quality) 
Dependent Variable: Score of CEE Social Science 
1984-2012 1989-2012 1984-2012 1989-2012 
Max level of parental education 5.631*** 5.754*** 2.589** 2.561** 
 (1.689) (1.491) (1.041) (1.020) 
Max level of parental education*HEE -3.925* -3.985** 2.811** 3.162** 
 (1.936) (1.764) (1.322) (1.217) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 2094 1882 2960 2616 
r2_a 0.126 0.106 0.103 0.097 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Table 27 The choice about category of CEE 
Dependent Variable Social (Yes=1, No=0) Science (Yes=1, No=0) 
 1984-2012 1989-2012 1984-2012 1989-2012 
Max level of parental education -0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Max level of parental education*HEE -0.011** -0.017** 0.013** 0.018** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
N 5421 4826 5421 4826 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
r2_a 0.063 0.066 0.069 0.072 
 Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 28  The positive relationship between ITE and family educational background 
 Dependent Variable: Score of CEE 
 ALL 1984-2012 1989-2012 1994-2012 
Max level of parental education 1.570* 1.103 0.885 1.651 
 (0.795) (0.982) (0.953) (1.048) 
Square of max level of parental education 0.948** 1.086*** 1.118** 0.892* 
 (0.335) (0.361) (0.393) (0.423) 
Control_X Y Y Y Y 
N 5760 5421 4826 4141 
r2_a 0.162 0.122 0.109 0.109 
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the level of province. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.0.  
  
We examine the explain that whether the students from better family educational background 
tend to choose CEE of science after HEE and the empirical results are presented in Table 27. The 
dependent variables in Table 27 are dummies for the category of CEE. According to the empirical 
results, the estimated coefficients of max level of parental education are all insignificant which 
means that the effect of family educational background on choosing the category of CEE is 
insignificant before HEE. However, after HEE, we find that the students from better family 
educational background relatively tend to choose science and the students from poor family 
educational background relatively tend to choose social. Next, we test that whether the ITE of the 
individuals from better family educational background is greater the ITE of the individuals from 
poor family educational background and the empirical results are presented in Table 28. We find 
that the estimated coefficients of the square of max level of parental education is significantly 
positive which means that the extent of ITE about school quality positively correlates with family 
educational background. Magnani and Zhu (2015) also get a similar conclusion. 
6. Conclusion 
In this article, we comprehensive investigate the effect of HEE on ITE. When we measure ITE 
with years of schooling, we find that HEE decreases ITE and ITE has an inverted-U relationship 
with college admission which directly demonstrates the theory of MMI. However, when we measure 
ITE with score of CEE denoting college quality, the empirical results show that ITE insignificantly 
change ITE and ITE seems be uncorrelated with college admission rate which indicates that the 
theory of EMI is corrected. Next, we examine the internal mechanism of this effects. We find that 
family educational background positively correlates with the type of senior high school. 
Additionally, the marginal effect of type of senior high school on years of schooling is decreased by 
HEE and HEE insignificantly changes the marginal effect of type of senior high school on score of 
CEE. At last, we investigate the heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE by gender, type of Hukou, 
and category of CEE. When we explain the heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE measured 
with years of schooling, we often focus on the difference in higher education supply. However, when 
we explain the heterogeneity in the effect of HEE on ITE about school quality, we often focus on 
the difference in higher education demand or human capital investment. Unfortunately, due to the 
limitation of data, we can’t examine the effect of HEE on family human capital investment. We 
  
conclude that HEE narrow the gap of years of schooling between the children from different family 
educational background but the gap of human capital between the children from different family 
educational background still maintain in some way. 
High quality educational resource, especially for higher education, is very scarce. Education 
expansion may lower the gap of years of schooling between the children from different family 
background, but the inequality of education still maintains in some way. According to the internal 
mechanism discussed in this article, we claim that the origin of the inequality of higher education is 
not the higher educational system nor the college admission system rather than the inequality of 
basic education due to the school district system and the inequality of public educational expenditure 
between different school districts.  
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